Receipts from capacity 'sale' of telecom cable link with transfer of ownership isn't taxable as 'royalty': ITAT

What is envisaged in section 9(1)(vi) read with Explanation thereto, is consideration for use or rights to use of any equipment. If consideration was received by foreign company for sale of capacity involving transfer of ownership of cable system to Indian Companyas distinguished from a mere payment for simply user of capacity,the consideration would not be taxable as royalty.

Facts:

a)The assessee-company was incorporated in Bermuda, from where it was managed and controlled. Since, India does not have any tax treaty with Bermuda, therefore, the Income Tax Act was applicable.

b)It was set up to build fibre optic cable system to increase the telecommunication traffic between and among Western Europe, Middle East, South Asia, South East Asia and Far East.

c)Assessee had entered into Memorandum of understanding (MOU) with 13 parties for the purpose of planning and implementation of the said Fibreoptic Cable System.Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (‘VSNL’) was one of the original landing party to the MOU. For the purpose of selling the capacity in the cable system, Cable Sales Agreement (CSA) was entered into amongst the parties.

d)The assessee had sold the capacity to VSNL for USD 28,940,000. The CSA provided for the ownership rights in the Cable System with all the rights and obligations in the capacity cable.

The issue that arose for consideration of Tribunal was:

Whether the amount of US $ 28,940,000 was taxable in the hands of assessee as royaltyincome-tax Act?

The Tribunal held in favour of assessee as under:

1)The entire agreement was for the period of 25 years which coincided with the life of the cable. In the agreement there were clear cut clauses for the ownership.

2)One of the clauses of agreement clearly envisaged that the net proceeds on disposition of the cable system would be shared amongst the signatories in proportion to their ownership rights.

3)Not only that, there was right to assign the capacity, which was borne out from the fact that purchaser of the capacity could sell or grant right to use the capacity in the cable system to some other party.

4)All this clearly indicated that the signatory would become the owner of the capacity in the cable system after the purchase, that is, the VSNL in the instant case.

5)This fact further establishes that there was no payment for simply user of the capacity. In case of a 'royalty', agreement, the complete ownership is never transferred to the other party.What is envisaged in section 9(1)(vi) read with Explanation thereto, is that there should be transfer of rights of any kind of the property as defined therein; or imparting of any information in respect of various kinds of property; or use of rights to use of any equipments,etc

6)If the consideration was received for transferring the ownership with all rights and obligations then such a consideration could not be taxed as 'royalty'. -Flag Telecom Group Ltd. v. DCIT - [2015] 54 taxmann.com 154 (Mumbai - Trib.)

CIT can’t consider violation of provisions of sec. 13 while granting registration to a trust

Provisions of section 13 couldn't be applied to deny registration to a trust or an Institution under section 12A - It shall be applied to decide deduction to be allowable to a trust or an Institution while completing assessment proceedings.

Facts:

a) In the instant case, one of the objects of the trust was limited to the benefit of Jain community;

b) The CIT contended that trust had violated provisions of section 13(1)(b) since benefits of sections 11 and 12 could not be extended to the charitable trust or institution which was established for the benefit of any specific religious community. Hence, he denied registration to trust under section 12A.

Issue:

• The issue that arose for consideration before the Tribunal was:

• "Whether the CIT has erred in denying the trust registration under Section 12A holding that the object clause of the Trust Deed is specifically for the benefit of the Jain Community which is a specific religious community and hence attracts the provisions of sec.13(1)(b)?"

The Tribunal Held in favour of assessee as under:

1)In order to avail of the deduction under sections 11 and 12 of the Act, the trust or institution has to make an application for registration under section 12AA of the Act;

2)The CIT after satisfying himself about the objects of the trust or Institution and about the genuineness of its activities, had to pass an order in writing granting or refusing the registration;

3)The Assessing Officer had to consider non-fulfillment of the conditions laid down in section 13(1)(b) during assessment procedure while allowing deduction under sections 11 and 12 to the trust or Institution;

4)Therefore, the CIT was not authorized to consider violation by the trust or Institution on account of provisions of section 13(1)(b) while granting it registration under section 12A-Kul Foundation v. CIT[2015] 54 taxmann.com 143 (Pune - Trib.)

Recognition of revenue by developer only on registration of sale deeds wasn't a valid method under sec. 145

Section 145 makes it mandatory on the part of the assessee to follow either cash or mercantile system of accounting.Recognizing the revenue by developer (i.e., assessee) only when the sale deedswould be registered in favour of the buyerscould not be regarded to be either cash or mercantile system of accounting. This method was neither project completion method nor percentage of completion method, thus, this was not a recognized method to recognize revenue under AS-7 too.

Facts:

a)Assessee was engaged in the business of real estate activities, such as construction of residential-cum-commercial project, developing of plots, etc. It had completed development work of plots on 31.3.2009, but it did not showthe sale proceeds in the profit and loss account even after receiving 70-80% of the sale proceeds.

b)The Assessing Officer (‘AO’) was of the view that development had already been completed, therefore, he re-computed the profit relating to these projects.

c)Assessee contended that he was following project completion method as per AS-7 and it was showing the sales when the registration of the sale deed would be carried out.

d)On appeal,theCIT(A) deleted the additions on the ground that the AO had changed the profit recognition method from project completion to percentage completion. The aggrieved revenue filed the instant appeal before Tribunal.

The Tribunal held in favour of revenue as under:

1)The CIT(A) had agreed with assessee’s contention that he was following the project completion method but assesseewas not recognizing the revenue on the basis of the project completion method.

2)Registration of the sale deed represents only the transfer of the title in favour of the buyer once development work on the plots had been completed.

3)Assessee was recognizing the revenue only when the sale deeds would be registered in favour of the buyers. Under AS-7 this was not a recognized method of recognizing the revenue. This method of revenue recognition followed by assessee was neither project completion method nor percentage of completion method.

4)Section 145 makes it mandatory on the part of the Assessee to follow either cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly. This method of recognizing the revenue when the sale deedswould be registered in favour of the buyerscould not be regarded as either cash or mercantile system of accounting.

5)Thus, the method adopted by the assessee was notin compliancewith the ingredients as laid down underSection 145.Consequently,the order of AO was to berestored–ACIT. v.Alcon Developers[2015] 54 taxmann.com 54 (Panaji - Trib.)

No denial of sec. 35 deduction without seeking opinion of prescribed authority about nature of research activity

Where assessee raised claim for deduction under section 35(1), Assessing Officer could not decide the issue but had to place the issue before the Board who, in terms of section 35(3), would refer the question to the prescribed authority to seek opinion on nature of research activity undertaken by assessee.

The issue that arose before the High Court was as under:

Whether AO could disallow deduction under section 35(1) without placing the matter before the CBDT to make a reference to the prescribed authority if he was not sure about nature of research activity undertaken by assessee?

The High Court held in favour of assesse as under:

1)Section 35(3) requires a reference to be made by the Board to the prescribed authority when a question arises as to whether and if so to what extent, any activity constitutes or constituted or any asset is or was being used for scientific research. The decision of the prescribed authority on such a question would be final.

2)Therefore, whenever any such question arises, the Assessing Officer cannot decide the issue but must place the issue before the Board who, in terms of section 35(3) of the Act, would refer the question to the prescribed authority.

3)However, no such reference is required in cases where the assessee lodges a claim without any supporting material or claim of the assesse is accepted by AO. - CIT V. MASTEK LTD.[2015] 53 taxmann.com 388 (Gujarat)

TPO can’t decide about deductibility of an exp. as his jurisdiction is limited to determination of ALP

Facts:

a)The international transaction which was disputed in the instant case was commission payment by the assessee to its AEs.

b)The TPO held that ALP of this transaction was Nil because the assessee failed to provide any evidence of an independent transaction between unrelated parties and further the assessee could not explain with any documentary evidence about the functions performed by the AE necessitating the payment of such commission.

c)The assessee remained unsuccessful before the DRP and the Assessing Officer, accordingly, made addition of entire commission paid by the assessee to its AEs. The aggrieved-assessee filed the instant appeal.

The Tribunal held in favour of assessee as under:

1)The Delhi High Court in the case CIT v. Cushman and Wakefield India Pvt. Ltd.[2014] 46 taxmann.com 317 (Delhi),held that the authority of the TPO was limited to conducting transfer pricing analysis for determining the ALP of an international transaction and not to decide if such services exist or benefits did accrue to the assessee. Such later aspects have been held to be falling in the exclusive domain of the AO.

2)Applying the ratio decidendi ofCushman and Wakefield India Pvt. Ltd. (supra)to the facts of the instant case, it was to be held that the TPO was required to simply determine the ALP of this transaction unconcerned with the fact, if any benefit accrued to the assessee and thereafter, it was for the AO to decide the deductibility of this amount under Section 37(1). 3)Therefore, case was remanded to AO with an instruction to decide the deductibility of the commission paid to foreign AE.- ITW INDIA LTD. V. ACIT[2015] 53 taxmann.com 531 (Delhi - Trib.)

BCCI to pay service tax on reverse charge basis on payments made to foreign Cos for audio-visual coverage of IPL matches

Services received by BCCI from foreign media companies for coverage of Indian Premier League Matches through audio-visual coverage of the cricket matches are covered under 'Programme production services' and liable to service tax on reverse charge basis.

a)Assessee, BCCI, received services from foreign media companies for coverage of Indian Premier League Matches.

b)As per agreements, such non-resident service providers were required to provide audio-visual coverage of the cricket matches conducted by BCCI and digitalized images of coverage were uploaded and broadcasted for benefit of the viewers of cricket match all over the world.

c)Department demanded service tax from BCCI under reverse charge.

d)Tribunal held in favour revenue:

.Section 65(86a) of the Finance Act, 1944 defines "programme" as any audio or visual matter, live or recorded, which is intended to be disseminated by transmission of electro-magnetic waves through space or through cables intended to be received by the general public either directly or indirectly through the medium of relay stations.

a.The Tribunal in its judgment observed that non-resident service providers had installed cameras in stadium to capture images of cricket matches.

b.A combination of audio and visual recording would be a programme and expression 'audio or visual matter' in section 65(86a) can be read as 'audio and visual matter' also, hence, activities undertaken by non-resident service providers would fall within definition of 'programme' and service providers would be 'programme producers', as defined.

c.Even services rendered by way of supply of equipments and personnel for recording live programmes and actually participating in such programmes would also fall within definition of 'programme producer's services’.

e)The Supreme Court dismissed appeal preferred against the judgment of Tribunal holding there was no infirmity in the said judgment - Board of Control for Cricket In India v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai-I [2015] 53 taxmann.com 533 (SC).

Aluminium dross and skimmings aren't manufactured goods; decision of larger bench of CESTAT reversed

Aluminium dross and skimmings and similar non-ferrous metal drosses and skimmings which arise as by-products in process of manufacture of aluminium/non-ferrous metal products are "not manufactured goods" and, hence, not liable to excise duty.

Facts:

a)The assessee was a manufacturer of aluminium sheets and coils falling under heading 7607 1190 of the Central Excise Tariff Act using major raw material 'aluminium ingots'.

b)In the course of manufacture of aluminium sheets/coils, aluminium dross/skimmings emerge as by products. The assessee sold these by products on a regular basis.

c)The department raised demand of duty on "aluminium dross/skimmings" on ground that it was a manufactured product and liable to excise duty in view of Explanation to section 2(d) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The Tribunal's Larger Bench held in favour of revenue.

d)Assessee argued that 'aluminium dross/skimmings' were not 'manufactured goods' and were not, therefore, liable to duty. It further argued that the Explanation was inserted in section 2(d) in order to clarify that the goods which could be bought and sold in the market were deemed to be marketable. The explanation deals only with the marketability aspect of the question and does not say that even non-manufactured goods are deemed to be manufactured goods.

The High Court held in favour of assessee as under:

1)In case of Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. A. K. Bandyopadhyay 1980 (6) ELT 146 (Bom.), it was held that dross and skimmings are not manufactured goods.

2)In Union of India v. Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. 1995 (77) ELT 268 (SC), the Supreme Court agreed with the reasons and conclusions of the Single Judge and confirmed the view taken in case of A.K. Bandyopadhyay (supra).

3)Further, the Supreme Court has held in Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Union of India 2011 (273) ELT 10(SC) that the conditions contemplated under section 2(d) and section 2(f) have to be satisfied conjunctively in order to entail imposition of excise duty under section 3 of the Act, therefore the impugned judgment of the Tribunal could not be agreed with. The larger Bench's decision did not take into account the fact that the authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court was binding on it.

4)Merely because the goods satisfying the test of being maerketable and saleable, it does not mean that the test of being manufactured in India has been satisfied. The Supreme Court had in aforesaid cases rejected argument of addition of dross, cinder, skimmings, etc. in the list of the items to the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff and also held 'that is not safe to make it excisable as it has to pass further test of manufactured or produced in India.'

5)Fact that the revenue did not wish to abide by them would not mean that the Tribunal was justified in not following them. The issue stood completely covered by the Judgments of the Supreme Court and which had been totally disregarded by the Tribunal.

6)All Circulars impugned in this Writ Petition brought to the notice of this Court would not survive after the legal position had been set out as above – Hindalco Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (2015) 53 taxmann.com 156 (Bombay).

Amended definition of NPA allowing different regulators to lay down different NPA norms isn't unconstitutional

Facts:

a)Prior to an amendment to definition of NPA, it was defined as 'an account of a borrower which has been classified' by a bank or financial institution ('Creditor') either 'as a sub-standard asset or a doubtful asset or a loss asset' of the Creditor and such a classification was required to be made in accordance with the guidelines issued by the RBI

b)However, under the amended definition, such a classification of NPA is required to be made in accordance with the guidelines issued by any authority which regulates such creditor and if the Creditor is not administered or regulated by any such Regulator then NPA classification is to be made in accordance with the guidelines issued by the RBI.

c)Amendment to definition of NPA i.e Section 2(1)(o) of SARFAESI Act was challenged in various High Courts. The Gujrat High Court, by a common judgment in a batch of writ petitions, held amended definition of NPA as unconstitutional.

d)On the other hand, the Madras High Court rejected the submission of the petitioners that the impugned provision suffers from the vires of excessive delegation

e)Learned counsel appearing for the borrowers/petitioners argued that the amended definition of NPA was unconstitutional on following grounds:

1.that the Parliament, by authorizing the various bodies to frame the guidelines in accordance with which the account of a borrower could be classified as a NPA abdicated its essential legislative function by making an excessive delegation;

2.the amended provision enables different Banks and Financial Institutions ('Creditors') to adopt different guidelines to classify account of a borrower as NPA

3.As the Act does not provide for a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that the classification of the borrower's account as a NPA is untenable, the power to make such a classification itself becomes arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. On writ, The Supreme Court upheld the Constitutional validity of amended definition of NPA and made following observations:

1)Authorizing different Regulators for e.g. National Housing Bank or Asian Development Bank and Housing Finance corporations to prescribe different norms for the identification of a NPA with reference to different Creditors would not amount to unreasonable classification for the reason that all the Creditors do not form a uniform/homogenous class

2)The function of prescribing the norms for classifying a borrower's account as a NPA was not an essential legislative function. The amendment of the definition of the expression 'NPA' under Section 2(1) (o) was not bad on account of excessive delegation of legislative function

3)Parliament was only stipulating that the expression "NPA" must be understood by all the Creditors in the same sense in which such expression is understood by the expert body i.e., the RBI or other Regulators which are in turn subject to the supervision of the RBI- KESHAVLAL KHEMCHAND AND SONS PVT. LTD. & OTHERS (2015) 53 TAXMANN.COM 470 (SC)

I-T authorities can collect relevant info to check tax evasion; HC upholds constitutional validity of sec. 133(6)

High Court has upheld the constitutional validity of amendment made to section 133(6) by the Finance Act, 1995 which widened the scope of the said section and gave power to AO to call for information not only in case of 'pending proceedings' but also as a part of the enquiry as said amendment was brought in to tackle tax evasion.

Facts:

a)The income tax authorities had issued notice to petitioner ('Co-Operative Bank'), asking it to furnish details of cash deposit in 'Savings Bank Accounts', aggregating to Rs.5 lakhs and details of payment of interest exceeding Rs.10,000/- to the depositors.

b)Consequently, the petitioner filed the instant writ to challenge the constitutional validity of section 133(6) which empowered the tax authorities to call for information not only in case of 'pending proceedings' but also as a part of the enquiry.

c)The petitioner contended that rights of privacy is an integral part of Article 21 of the constitution of India, which in turn, was violated.

The High Court dismissed the writ by holding as under:

1)Even assuming that the right to privacy is itself a fundamental right, such fundamental right must be subject to restriction, on the basis of compelling 'public interest'.

2)There is no prohibition on the State in gathering information for preventing tax evasion and curbing black money as proceedings can be pursued against wrongdoers only on basis of some information.

3)It is well-settled principle that the 'taxation entry' confers powers upon the Legislature to legislate in matters 'ancillary or incidental', including the provisions for evasion of tax.

4)Thus, no case was made out for striking down section 133(6) or second proviso thereto as unconstitutional, in so far as they apply to inquiries when no proceeding is pending- Pattambi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Union of India (2015) 53 taxmann.com 453 (Kerala)

Uttarakhand HC denies quashing of notification that blacklisted Cyprus for not sharing tax information

The Government had specified ‘Cyprus’ as notified jurisdictional area' for the purposes of the section 94A via NOTIFICATION NO.86/2013 as it was not providing information sought for by Indian Tax authorities. The instant petition was filed to quash such notification on the ground that "Cyprus" ought not have been declared as notified jurisdictional area as they had never denied any information and they had been ready and willing to supply the information sought for by the Indian Government. The High Court denied quashing of said notification.

Facts:

The instant petition was filed to quash the Notification no. 86/2013, on the ground that "Cyprus" ought not have been declared as notified jurisdictional area as Cyprus have never denied any information and they had been ready and willing to supply the information sought by the Government of India.

The High Court denied to quash the notification and made following observations:

1)Bare perusal of the notification would reveal that Cyprus had not been providing the information as requested by the Indian Authorities under the provisions of Exchange of Information Agreement, therefore, Government of India had decided to notify Cyprus as notified jurisdictional area under Section 94-A.

2)While exercising the writ jurisdiction ordinarily Court should not proceed to look into whether information sought by the Indian Authorities was declined by the Government of Cyprus or whether the Government of Cyprus was ready and willing to supply the information sought for by the Indian Authorities. Moreover, there seemed to be no valid reason to disbelieve the satisfaction so recorded by the Indian Authorities.

3)Thus, relief sought for by petitioner could not be granted. - EXPRO GULF LTD. V. UNION OF INDIA [2015] 53 taxmann.com 413 (Uttarakhand)