Relinquishment of right to purchase a property in lieu of a sum was ‘transfer’; to be taxed as capital gain

Consideration received from relinquishment of right to purchase a property to be taxed as capital gain and not as income of other sources as relinquishment of right over a capital asset amounts to transfer under section 2(47).

Facts:

a)The assessee entered into an agreement to purchase a plot. As per the terms of agreement of sale, assessee paid certain sum as advance to the vendor with the understanding to pay the balance at the time of registration.

b)Since the vendor did not act upon the agreement of sale, the assessee filed a suit for specific performance, which ultimately resulted in compromise. A Memorandum of Understanding (‘MOU’) was entered into between the assessee and the land owner in terms of which assessee gave up his claim over property against consideration of Rs. 1.50 crore (including the advance of Rs. 25 lakhs paid by the assessee at the time of agreement of sale).

c)The assessee disclosed said amount as sale consideration received by him for transfer of plot and computed long term capital gain which was accepted by the Assessing Officer (AO)

. d)The CIT revised the order of AO with an opinion that amount received by the assessee from the land owner being a windfall gain, should have been assessed as income from other sources and not as long-term capital gain. Aggrieved assessee filed the instant appeal.

The Tribunal held in favour of assessee as under:

1)Relinquishing or extinguishing one's right over a capital asset amounts to transfer as per section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, when the assessee, as per terms of the MOU, gave up his claim over the property against consideration, certainly it could be interpreted that the assessee had relinquished or extinguished his right over the property.

2)Thus, there was 'transfer' of capital asset within the purview of section 2(47) attracting capital gain.

3)The assessment order passed by AO could not be considered to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of revenue, only because the Commissioner considered the receipts as windfall gain and in his opinion such receipt had to be assessed as income from other sources -P. Ramgopal Varma vs. ACIT [2014] 47 taxmann.com 334 (Hyderabad - Trib.)

SAT: Failure to make disclosure under Insider Trading norms attracts penalty, irrespective of mitigating factors

Irrespective of mitigating factors such as disproportionate gain or unfair advantage derived or any loss caused to investors, failure to make timely disclosures under regulation 13 SEBI (Prevention of Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992 would attract penalty

FACTS:

a)The appellant-company had become part of the promoter group of 'INCL' and on account of acquiring control of 'INCL' was obliged to file disclosures under regulation 13(2A) , read with regulation 13(6) of the SEBI (Prevention of Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992.

b)The appellant-company was imposed with penalty for not making disclosures within stipulated time period under regulation 13(2A) of the SEBI (Prevention of Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992.

c)On appeal to the Securities Appellate Tribunal

On appeal, The Securities Appellate Tribunal held as under:

1)An obligation to make disclosure under said regulation is not restricted to cases where there is disproportionate gain or unfair advantage and where loss is caused to investors as a result of failure to make disclosures.

2)Since Explanation to regulation 13 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prevention of Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992 does not deal with disclosure requirements, argument of appellant-company that there was confusion regarding disclosure requirements contemplated in said regulations as compared to Takeover Regulations did not merit consideration.

3)Therefore, penalty imposed after consideration of mitigating factors could not be said to be arbitrary or unreasonably excessive and, thus, order passed by Assessing Officer could not be interfered with. – IndiaNivesh Capitals Ltd. vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India [2014] 47 taxmann.com 339 (SAT - Mumbai)

Institutions providing event management courses without awarding any diploma not entitled to sec. 12AA registration

Institutions conducting classes in event management were not entitled to Section 12AA registration as such courses do not result in conferment of any degree or diploma; such activity would not fall within the meaning of education under Sec. 2(15).

Facts:

a)The assessee-institution was formed with an object to establish and administer schools, colleges, etc.

b)In furtherance of its objects, it established an institution for teaching event management course. It filed an application seeking registration under section 12AA.

c)The CIT held that activity carried on by assessee would not fall within meaning of education as mentioned in section 2(15) and rejected assessee's claim for registration. The aggrieved assessee filed the instant appeal.

The Tribunal held in favour of revenue as under:

1)The Supreme Court in case of Sole Trustee, Loka Shikshana Trust v. CIT [1975] 101 ITR 234 held that the acquisition of all kinds of knowledge would not fall within the definition of education as provided under Section 2(15) and the acquisition of knowledge should be through a normal schooling to be regarded as education.

2)Thus, it was a well-settled principle that there had to be a systematic instruction to the students by way of normal schooling to be regarded as education. Mere conducting of event management classes might provide some kind of knowledge to the students; but that acquisition of knowledge would not fall within the meaning of 'education' as provided in section 2(15).

3)In the instant case, the assessee was conducting classes in event management but the government or any governmental bodies did not recognize the institution run by the assessee.

4)Therefore, the teaching courses conducted by the assessee would not result in conferment of any degree or diploma and remained unrecognised. Thus, the assessee was not eligible for registration under section 12AA. – IMPRESSARIO EDUCATIONAL TRUST V. CIT [2014] 47 taxmann.com 259 (Cochin - Trib.)

No liability of bank to withhold tax from cap gains remitted to a non-resident when it was merely acting as broker

Where assessee-bank was only acting as an authorized dealer to brokers of foreign residents in transferring funds in respect of share transactions, which resulted in gains, it was not liable to withhold tax under section 195.

Facts:

a)Individuals (residents of UAE) carried out transactions in shares through brokers and earned short-term capital gains. The assessee-bank made remittances on behalf of brokers in respect of these gains without deduction of tax.

b)According to the AO, the assessee-bank (in capacity as remitter) was to deduct tax at source before making overseas payments under section 195. Subsequently, the AO held that the assessee-bank was a defaulter under section 201 and was liable to pay interest under section 201(1A). On appeal, the CIT(A) reversed the order of AO.

On appeal, the Tribunal held in favour of assessee as under:

1)The ITAT Mumbai Bench in the case of Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corpn. Ltd.,v. Jt. CIT [2009] 29 SOT 17 had held that capital gains arising to the NRIs residing in UAE were short term capital gains and the bank, which was acting as an authorized dealer, was not liable to deduct tax. Consequently, the AO was not justified in treating the assessee as a defaulter under section 201;

2)In the instant case, the non-residents had earned short-term capital gains and the assessee-bank was only acting as an authorized dealer in transferring the funds on behalf of the broker.

3)Thus, following the order of ITAT Mumbai bench (Supra) it was to be held that assessee-bank was not a person responsible for paying tax within the meaning of section 204 and, therefore, it was not liable to deduct tax at source under section 195. Therefore, assessee-bank could not be treated as a defaulter within the meaning of section 201. – ITO(IT)(TDS) V. ABU DHABI COMMERCIAL BANK [2014] 47 taxmann.com 263 (Mumbai - Trib.)

Salary income declared after search proceedings would be deemed as undisclosed even if tax was deducted there from

Where return was filed by assessee after block assessment proceedings were initiated by the AO, the intention of assessee was not to disclose income and, therefore, same was required to be treated as an undisclosed income as per section 158B(b).

Facts:

The issue that arose for consideration of the High Court was:

Whether non-disclosure of the salary income (by not filing the return of income) on which the tax was deducted at source, could be treated as "undisclosed income" within the meaning thereof in Section 158B(b)?

The High Court held in favour of revenue as under:

1)The Supreme Court in Asstt. CIT v. A.R. Enterprises [2013] 29 taxmann.com 50 held that since the tax to be deducted at source is also computed on the estimated income of an assessee, such deduction cannot result in the disclosure of the total income for the relevant assessment year'.

2)The assessee filed the return declaring the income only when the block assessment proceedings were initiated by the AO. It indicated that there was no intention on the part of assessee to disclose the income.

3)Therefore, the salary income was required to be treated as undisclosed income within the meaning thereof in section 158B(b). The Tribunal had materially erred in not treating the income earned by way of salary as 'undisclosed income'. – ASSTT. CIT V. MINOOBHAI D. IRANI [2014] 47 taxmann.com 289 (Gujarat)

No transfer under sec. 2(47) if share in inherited property was transferred pursuant to Court decree

Amount received by assessee pursuant to a Court decree in lieu of her share in self acquired property of father who died intestate, could not be said to result in 'transfer' attracting provisions of section 2(47).

Facts:

a)The Father (‘B’) of assessee (daughter) died intestate leaving behind four sons and six daughters including the assessee. After expiry of 'B', assessee along with other sisters filed a suit for partition of self acquired property of their father.

b)The Court duly recognized the suit compromised between the parties. In terms of memorandum of compromise, the daughters agreed to receive their 1/10th share in property, i.e., a sum of Rs. 87.50 lakhs each from their brothers.

c)The assessee's brothers subsequently entered into a joint development agreement of property. In terms of said agreement, the developer directly paid amount of Rs. 87.50 lakh each to daughters including assessee herein. The daughters thereupon executed a release deed of disputed property in favour of their brothers.

d)The assessee had not offered to tax the impugned sum on the ground that there was no transfer of any capital asset. The AO made additions on the ground that the said transaction was to be deemed as transfer under section 2(47). The CIT (A) confirmed the order of AO. The aggrieved assessee filed instant appeal.

The Tribunal held in favour of assessee as under:

1)In the instant case, on death of 'B', their children became entitled to 1/10th share each over the property by way of intestate succession. Since a physical division of each of the 1/10th share was not possible, sons took the property and daughters took money equivalent to their share over the property.

2)The sum received by the assessee was thus traceable to the realization of her rights as legal heir on intestate succession and not to any sale, relinquishment or extinguishment of right to property. It was, thus, clear that the release deed was executed by daughters (in favour of their brothers) only to confer better title over the property. That document did not create, extinguish or modify the rights over the property either of the sons or the daughters.

3)The sum of Rs.87.50 lakhs was paid only through Court and not at the time of registration of the deed of release. The document of release was between the daughters and sons. The developer was not a party to the document. The developer was also not a party to the suit for partition.

4)Therefore, the conclusions of the revenue authorities that there was a conveyance of the share of the daughters in favour of the developer was contrary to the written and registered document and could not be sustained. Thus, revenue authorities were not justified in taxing the impugned amount as capital gains in the hands of the assessee. – SMT. T. GAYATHRI V. ITO [2014] 47 taxmann.com 190 (Bangalore - Trib.)

ITAT follows AS-10 to include one-time vehicle tax in cost of vehicle treating it as capital expenditure

Facts:

The issue that arose in the instant appeal was:

Whether one time vehicle tax paid by the assessee was includible in cost of vehicles, (eligible to depreciation) or, was in nature of revenue expenditure, deductible under Section 37(1)?

The Tribunal held in favour of revenue as under:

1)Section 43(1) defines the term 'actual cost' as under: "Actual cost" means the actual cost of the assets to the assessee, reduced by that portion of the cost thereof, if any, as has been met directly or indirectly by any other person or authority.

2)The definition emphasizes on the elements, which would not form a part thereof, so that the principles of commercial accounting would apply in determining the actual cost. Even otherwise, it was a trite law that in the absence of a statutory definition or mandate, the accounting prescription would prevail.

3)It is only where the law specifically provides for a particular course of action, inconsistent with the accounting mandate, that the same shall prevail and override the latter, viz., section 43B.

4)Para 20 of ‘Accounting Standard-10 - Accounting for Fixed Assets’ required that the cost of a fixed asset would comprise of its purchase price and any attributable cost of bringing the asset to its working condition for its intended use.

5)One-time tax for the lifetime of "all motor cars and omnibuses used or kept for use" in the State of Maharashtra was a tax for user, active or passive, of the motor vehicle in the territory of Maharashtra. Therefore, payment of tax, only enabled the vehicle being put to its intended use; in fact, represented a condition thereof, and would form part of its cost. - M. DINSHAW & CO. (P.) LTD. V. DY. CIT [2014] 48 taxmann.com 190 (Mumbai - Trib.)

CCI approved of proposed combination of retailers as their share was not significant in retailer’s market

Where in proposed combination of retail businesses in India shares of parties to combination were insignificant as compared to overall retail market, proposed combination was not likely to have appreciable adverse effect on competition in India and, therefore, same was to be approved

Facts:

a)The Tesco Overseas Investments Limited (‘TOIL’)gave notice to Commission relating to proposed acquisition of 50 per cent of issued and paid-up equity share capital of Trent Hypermarket Limited (‘THL’).

b)The proposed combination related to retail business in India which comprised both organized and un-organized retailing.

c)It was found that some of large players who had been operating in organized retail market in India were Reliance Retail, Future Retail, Spencer's retail, Bharti Retail, Aditya Birla's 'More', Shoppers Stop, etc.

d)Additionally, due to increased internet penetration and changing lifestyles, Indian retail market had also witnessed a surge in online retailers which had widened the choice for consumers.

e)‘THL’ operated only 16 retail stores across various locations in India. Its total revenue was insignificant as compared to size of overall retail market as well as organized retail market in India.

The Competition Commission of India held as under:

1)It was observed that while ‘THL’ was engaged in business of multi-format retail trading in India, including hypermarkets, supermarkets and smaller convenience stores, ‘TOIL’ was not present in retail market in India and, therefore, there was no horizontal overlap between business activities of ‘THL’ and ‘TOIL’ in retail market in India.

2)On facts, combination was not likely to have appreciable adverse effect on competition in India and, therefore, same was to be approved– Tesco Overseas Investments Ltd., In re [2014] 47 taxmann.com 261 (CCI)

Conducting educational diploma courses and management programmes was an educational activity under sec. 2(15)

Facts:

a)The assessee, a public charitable trust, was having objects of continuing education, training and research on various facets of management and related areas.

b)It claimed exemption under section 11. The Assessing Officer (‘AO’) held that activities of assessee would fall within scope of 'advancement of any other object of general public utility’ and the assessee would not be entitled to exemption under Section 11 as its aggregate receipts exceeded the limit specified under second proviso to Section 2(15).

c)The CIT(A) confirmed the said order. Further, the Tribunal reversed the order of CIT(A). The aggrieved revenue filed the instant appeal.

The High Court held in favour of assessee as under:

1)The revenue had denied the exemption under section 11 mainly on the ground that the case of the assessee would fall under the fourth limb of the definition of 'charitable purpose' i.e. 'advancement of any other object of general public utility'.

2)The activities of the assessee such as continuing education diploma, certificate programmes; management development programmes, public seminars, workshops and conferences, etc., were educational activities. 3)Second proviso to section 2(15) would not apply in respect of relief to the poor; education or medical relief. Thus, where the purpose of a trust or institution was relief of the poor; education or medical relief, it would constitute 'charitable purpose' even if it incidentally involved the carrying on of the commercial activities.

4)In the instant case, as the activities of assessee would fall within realm of education which was a 'charitable' purpose as per section 2(15). The assessee was entitled to exemption under section 11. – DIT(Exemption) v. Ahmedabad Management Association [2014] 47 taxmann.com 162 (Gujarat)

Undue delay in filing of appeal was not condonable when assessee was working with professional advice of CA

Delay in filing appeal not acceptable when it was found that assessee was acting on professional advice of Chartered Accountant.

Facts:

a)The Commissioner invoked the revsional jurisdiction directing the Assessing Officer to redo the assessment, and, accordingly, the Assessing Officer (‘AO’) passed an order under section 143(3). The assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A), which was dismissed.

b)The assessee submitted that it was not in his knowledge that an appeal laid against the order under Section 263, and it was only when he approached an Advocate, it came to his knowledge that appeal was not filed.

c)The assessee prayed that since the delay was neither intentional nor deliberate, but was for valid reasons, it might be condoned.

The Tribunal held in favour of revenue as under:

1)The assessee had filed the appeal against the consequential order passed by the AO and a Chartered Accountant represented it.

2)It was clear that the assessee was acting on the professional advice of the Chartered Accountant. Therefore, it could not be accepted that the assessee was unaware of the legal remedy available to it.

3)However, the assessee had filed the present appeal, nearly more than a year after the filing of the original appeal. Thus, the assessee had not satisfactorily explained the delay in the filing of the appeal against the order under section 263.

4)It proved that the assessee had not been vigilant enough in pursuing its legal remedies. Therefore, the delay in the filing of the appeal could not be condoned and, consequently, the appeal was to be dismissed as time-barred. - PIONEER E BIZZ. (P.) LTD. V. DY./ACIT [2014] 46 taxmann.com 456 (Hyderabad - Trib.)