‘Equipment’ includes Ship and charter fees thereof is ‘royalty’; HC refers to Sec. 43(3) to define word ‘equipment’

‘Equipment' includes ship, fee paid for use of ship to be considered as royalty under sec. 9(1)(vi). Meaning of the word ‘plant’ as defined under Sec. 43(3) would be relevant to determine meaning of the word ‘equipment’.

The aggrieved assessee appealed against order of Tribunal holding that the payment made for taking ship on time charter basis would constitute ‘royalty’ as defined under Section 9(1)(vi)(b) of the Income Tax Act (‘the I-T Act’). Assessee contended that the ship was not equipment and, consequently, there was no question of use or right to use of any equipment which could be construed as ‘royalty’.

The High Court held in favour of revenue as under:

1) The consideration paid for use of the industrial, commercial and scientific equipment is ‘royalty’ in view of clause (iva) of Explanation 2 to Section 9(1)(vi) of the I-T Act. The word ‘equipment’ is not defined under Section 9, however, the word ‘plant’ has been defined under Section 43(3). In view of Section 43(3), the word ‘plant’ is widely defined to include a ship;

2) In absence of any definition of ‘equipment’ under the I-T Act and considering the business of the foreign enterprise, the definition of ‘plant’, as including ‘ship’ would be appropriate for understanding the scope of the expression ‘equipment’;

3)  ‘Plant’ includes every tool, apparatus, equipment or machinery, not limited to machinery used in tool. Thus, with the inclusive definition of plant embracing within its fold so diverse a matter from a ship to a book, or medical equipment, every tool, apparatus, ‘plant’ includes all equipments used by an assessee for carrying on his business;

4) The word ‘equipment’ construed in the light of Section 9(1)(vi) extends the normal meaning of the word to cover even those specified categories of machinery or plant that would themselves not be construed within its plain and ordinary meaning. As rightly pointed out by the Revenue, the only limitation that one may read into the word ‘equipment’ would be that which is specifically excluded;

5) In context of Section 9(1)(vi)(b), the presence of the word ‘any’ preceding the word ‘equipment’, clearly points out the need for construing ‘equipment’ widely, so as to embrace every article employed by the employer for the purposes of his business. ‘Equipment’, by whatever name called either as an apparatus or as plant or machinery, so long as they are employed for the purposes of one’s income, the same shall stand covered by clause (iva) of Explanation 2;

6) Therefore, in absence of any word of limitation other than what was explicitly provided for, we do not find any legal necessity of reading a limitation on the word equipment. Thus, ship being a plant, an equipment with which the ship owner operates the business and commercially exploits it for earning the income from chartering of ship, the payment thereof would be clearly in nature of ‘royalty’ - Poompuhar Shipping Corporation Ltd. v.  ITO, International Taxation [2013] 38 taxmann.com 150 (Madras)

ITAT devises formula for claiming lease equalization charges – gap of annual lease charges and depreciation as per Income-tax Act

While allowing deduction on account of lease equalization charges, only difference between annual lease charge of leased assets and depreciation allowed on said leased asset under the Income-tax (‘I-T’) Act should be taken into consideration

The Tribunal held as under:

1) The concept of lease equalization charge could also be followed for the purpose of computing the total income under the I-T Act. However, the same has to be done with proper care and caution, otherwise it might result in absurdity and give misleading result;

2) In the instant case the relevant transactions were treated as finance lease transaction and, the depreciation allowed as per the rates prescribed in the I-T Act could be more than the depreciation claimed by the assessee at the rate prescribed under the Companies Act;

3) For example, the assessee might be entitled to claim depreciation at 100 per cent on the leased assets in the first year itself under the I-T Act whereas in the books of account, it might have claimed depreciation on the said leased assets under the Companies Act at the rate of 10 per cent;

4) In such a case if the annual leasing charge was equivalent to 30 per cent of the value of leased assets, the assessee would debit its profit
and loss account by lease equalization charges to the extent of 20 per cent of the value of asset as per the guidance note issued by the ICAI;

5) If the lease equalization charges so debited were to be allowed as deduction while computing the total income of the assessee under the I-T Act in addition to 100 per cent depreciation already allowed, the assessee would get the deduction of 120 per cent of the value of asset in the first year itself and the very purpose of adopting the concept of lease equalization would be defeated. This would result in absurdity and give misleading results;

6) It was, therefore, necessary that while allowing deduction on account of lease equalization charges for the purpose of computing total income under the I-T Act, the difference between the annual lease charge of the leased assets and depreciation allowed on the said leased asset under the I-T Act should be taken into consideration - Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services Ltd v. Dy.CIT [2013] 38 taxmann.com 40 (Mumbai - Trib.)

Advance Ruling binding on both revenue and assessee; CBEC’s circular holding otherwise is invalid

Advance ruling is binding on Department as well as assessee; CBEC clarification holding contrary view and issued later in point of time, cannot annul advance ruling pronounced in favour of assessee

In the instant case the advance ruling was pronounced in assessee's favour, which was not challenged and became final. Later, on clarification being sought by some other person from CBEC, it issued a Circular holding a view contrary to order of Authority for Advance Ruling. The Department argued that view expressed in CBEC Circular was applicable to the assessee.

The High court held in favour of assessee with following observation:

1) In the instant case, the assessee himself had not sought any clarification from CBEC. A clarification sought for by some other person couldn’t bind the assessee for whom advance ruling was binding;

2) CBEC clarification, issued later in point of time, did not and could not have annulled advance ruling in view of provisions of section 96D(2) read with section 96E - Gras Impex (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [2013] 38 taxmann.com 65 (Karnataka)

Worried over rising prices of CNG – Complain to Petroleum Regulatory Board rather than Competition Commission

Commission would not proceed with complaint regarding pricing of PNG when Petroleum & Natural Gas Regulatory Board was looking into grievances of consumers and pricing of CNG/PNG

Facts:

a) The complainant, a consumer of Piped Natural Gas (PNG) supplied by Indraprastha Gas Limited (‘IGL’), sent a complaint to the Chairman, MRTPC as regards price charged by IGL;

b) The complainant submitted that the respondent was exploiting its monopoly in the capital city of Delhi by not passing on the benefits of APM Gas to the domestic consumer and was charging a much higher rate than the Gujarat Gas and MG;

c) The complainant contended that the Commission should issue cease and desist order against the IGL from misusing its monopoly position and profiteering at the cost of its consumers and that the order should specify that IGL should start charging not more than Rs. 9.25 per scm for PNG.

The Competition Appellate Tribunal held as under:

1) The Commission doesn’t find it necessary to proceed with this matter particularly because the grievance of the consumers generally was being
looked into by the Petroleum & Natural Gas Regulatory Board (‘PNGRB’) who has taken up the exercise to decide and to enquire into the price structure of CNG/PNG by all the entities engaged in the business which would include the supplies made in Mumbai, Gujarat and Calcutta, etc.;

2) If the PNGRB was already doing that exercise, there would be no need for the Commission to go into the further state of affairs particularly in view of the absence of total evidence except the balance sheet of IGL suggesting that IGL had made some profits and statistics before the Commission;

3)  Thus, it was not deemed fit to proceed in the matter particularly in the absence of the evidence and also because a body like PNGRB with all the necessary statistics was enquiring into the matter – DG (I & R) v. Indraprastha Gas Service [2013] 38 taxmann.com 59 (CAT - New Delhi)

In absence of an agreement, transfer of land by assessee to his AOP won’t be deemed as transfer

Where assessee contended that he formed an AOP and transferred a land to it, but no agreement between assessee and AOP was found, transaction would not amount to transfer

In the instant case, the assessee had an agricultural land which was declared as industrial estate. He and other landowners within that industrial estate formed an AOP and transferred this land to it. The CIT (A) held that the land stood transferred in terms of section 2(47) to AOP. He, therefore, directed the AO to assess capital gain on each member of the AOP on account of transfer of capital asset. On appeal, the Tribunal refused to interfere.  Aggrieved assessee filed the instant appeal.

The High Court held in favour of assessee as under:

1) For the purpose of income tax, a capital asset may be transferred to an AOP as is provided in section 2(47);

2) However, when the capital asset is an immovable property by reason of the provisions contained in the Transfer of Property Act, read with the Registration Act, transfer of an immovable property of the nature dealt with herein requires an instrument which is also required to be registered;

3) Thus, transfer will take effect in a situation as provided in section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, namely, when there is an agreement to transfer and, in part performance thereof, the transferee is in possession of the immovable property agreed to be transferred;

4) In the instant case, there was no conveyance by the appellant in favour of AOP, nor there any agreement between them and AOP also didn’t contend that in pursuance of that agreement and in part performance thereof, it was in possession of the property in question. Therefore, the impugned transaction wouldn’t be deemed as transfer - Rajesh Kumar Agarwal v. ITO [2013] 37 taxmann.com 442 (Uttarakhand)

Payment of one time lease premium to acquire a leashold land isn’t subject to tax deduction under sec. 194-I

Where payment of lease premium was not made on periodical basis but it was one-time payment to acquire land with right to construct a commercial complex thereon, section 194-I had no application on deposit of such lease premium
In the instant case the Mumbai Development Authority offered certain land on lease to assessee for a period of 80 years for certain consideration comprising of lease premium. The assessee paid said premium in two installments. The AO held that the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source on lease premium under section 194-I.The CIT (A) held in favour of assessee. Aggrieved revenue filed the instant appeal.

The Tribunal held in favour of assessee as under:

1) In Durga Das Khanna v. CIT [1969] 72 ITR 796 (SC), the Supreme Court held that the onus was on the Revenue to demonstrate that premium has been camouflaged as advance rent and the AO, in the instant case has not brought on record any material to indicate that the rent has been suppressed and the premium has been inflated.

2) Thus, undoubtedly premium in relation to leased land was on capital account not liable to be classified as revenue outgoing;

3) Since the payment of lease premium was not to be made on periodical basis but it was one- time payment to acquire land with right to construct a commercial complex thereon, section 194-I was not applicable

4) Therefore, the impugned sum does not constitute advance rent, but it was to be classified as lease premium for capital expenditure not falling within the operative realm of section 194-I -  ITO v. Indian Newspapers Society [2013] 37 taxmann.com 401 (Delhi - Trib.)

No tax on FTS if service utilized for business carried abroad; upgradation of existing website is revenue exp.

In the instant case, two moot questions were raised before the ITAT which were as under:

A. Whether website development charges were deductible as revenue expenditure?

B. Liability of tax deduction on overseas commission

On first issue, it held in favour of assessee as under:

1) Commission paid to non-residents for services rendered outside India does not accrue or arise in India;

2) Hence, no TDS was deductible from such commission and such commission couldn’t be disallowed under section 40(a)(i);

3) Even if services rendered by the non-resident did fall within the definition of "fees for technical services, the commission paid would not
be taxable in India as clause(b) of section 9(1)(vii) would save the assessee.

On second issue, it held in favour of assessee as under:

1) Expenses incurred for upgradation of an existing website ought to be distinguished from expenses for development of a new website;

2) The former was revenue expenditure and the latter was capital expenditure, resulting in creation of an intangible asset;

3) Expenditure on upgradation of existing website was equivalent to maintenance of an existing asset. Thus, it was revenue expenditure - Mahindra Holidays & Resorts India Ltd. v. JCIT (LTU) [2013] 38 taxmann.com 207 (Chennai - Trib.)

Hollow rooms with basic amenities can’t be said to be an habitable house; not eligible for sec. 54F relief

Where house constructed by assessee was not found to be habitable, deduction under section 54F could not be allowed

In the instant case the assessee claimed deduction under section 54F on ground that she had purchased a house. When the AO carried enquiry, he found that there was no construction as mentioned in the sale deed. Instead, there was a small construction consisting of two rooms made of hollow bricks. Accordingly, the claim of deduction was disallowed by AO. Further, the CIT (A) upheld the order of the AO. Aggrieved assessee filed the instant appeal.

The Tribunal held in favour of revenue as under:

1) The assessee had not placed necessary evidence in support of his claim to show that the said construction was in habitable condition. A construction in inhabitable position couldn’t be equated with a residential house;

2) If a person cannot live in premises, then such premises cannot be considered as a residential house. Investment in the construction would be complete as a house only when such house becomes habitable;

3) The evidence brought on record by the AO clearly shows that the property purchased by the assessee would not fall within the description of residential house. Thus, the claim of the assessee couldn’t be allowed under section 54F - Smt. Usharani Kalidindi v. ITO [2013] 37 taxmann.com 360 (Hyderabad - Trib.)

Share issue exp. remains a capital expenditure even if SEBI disapproves of issue of shares; no sec. 37(1) allowance

Share issue expenses cannot be allowed as revenue expenditure even when shares could not be issued due to non-approval by SEBI

In the instant case the assessee incurred expenditure for issuing shares. However, on account of non-clearance from the SEBI, shares could not be issued. It claimed deduction for share issue expenses as revenue expenditure by contending that since the expenditure did not yield any desired result, the character of the expenditure had to be decided on the basis of the result that would yield benefit in assessee's business. The AO and the CIT (A) disallowed such expenses. The Tribunal also affirmed the view of the AO. Aggrieved assessee filed the instant appeal.

The High Court held in favour of revenue as under:

1) The impugned expenses were incurred by the assessee for the purpose of widening its capital base. The assessee, admittedly, took steps to go
in for public issue and after incurring expenditure, just before the public issue, by reason of the orders from the SEBI, the assessee could not go in for public issue. Thus, the efforts were aborted;

2) There was no justifiable ground to accept the plea of the assessee that on account of the abortive efforts, the expenditure incurred would lose its character as capital expenditure for the purpose of allowing it as a revenue expenditure - Mascon Technical Services Ltd. v. CIT [2013] 37 taxmann.com 253 (Madras)

NR can claim benefit of first proviso to Sec. 48 along with Sec. 112 concessional rate; HC quashes Cairn India ruling

Proviso to section 112(1) doesn’t deny benefit of lower tax rate of 10% to a non-resident investor availing benefit of exchange rate neutralization under first proviso to section 48. It is incorrect to say that 10% rate under proviso to section 112(1) applies only where indexation benefit under 2nd proviso to section 48 applies and still assessee opts to not avail it.

The High Court held as under:

1) The proviso to Section 112(1) doesn’t state that an assessee, who had availed benefit of the first proviso to Section 48, was not entitled to benefit of lower rate of tax. The said benefit couldn’t be denied because the second proviso to Section 48 was not applicable;

2) The stipulation for taking advantage of the proviso to Section 112(1) is that the aggregate of long term capital gains to the extent it exceeds 10% of the amount of capital gains, should be before giving effect to the provisions of second proviso to Section 48.;

3) First proviso to Section 48 stipulates that on sale of the securities by the non-resident, the consideration received in Indian rupee should be reconverted into the same foreign currency;

4) For a non-resident who has utilized foreign currency for purchase of securities in Indian rupee, inflation in India was immaterial and inconsequential. He is most concerned with exchange rate fluctuation and his true and actual gain should take into account the exchange rate fluctuation;

5) The second proviso is applicable to all others including non-residents, who are not covered by the first proviso and they are entitled to benefit of cost of indexation which neutralize inflation;

6) It is a misnomer and wrong to state that inflation alone contributes and is the determinative factor in exchange rate fluctuation. Inflation by itself cannot be the sole or even a primary factor in exchange rate depreciation. These are several others complex factors and parameters which can affect the foreign exchange rate fluctuation.

7) The first and second proviso to section 48 cannot be equated as granting same relief or benefit. They operate independently and have different purpose and objective. Thus, it couldn’t be deemed that benefits under the first proviso and the second proviso to Section 48 are identical or serve the same purpose;

8) Thus, it was to be held that assessee was taxable at concessional rate of 10% as per proviso to section 112(1) - Cairn UK Holdings Ltd. v. DIT [2013] 38 taxmann.com 179 (Delhi)