Sec. 194J not attracted on payments made to film actors for modeling as it isn’t connected with acting in film

Payments for modeling services made to a film actor are not connected with production of cinematograph film. Therefore, sec. 194J not attracted on payments made to film actor for modeling services

In the instant case, the following issue came for consideration of Mumbai ITAT:

Whether payments made to actor-model for rendering modeling services are outside the scope of section 194J of the Act?

The Tribunal held in favour of assessee as under:

1) Professional services include profession notified under section 44AA, which defines film artist, to mean, inter alia, any person engaged in his professional capacity in the production of cinematograph film as an actor;

2) Total earning of a film actor for services rendered by him isn’t liable to tax deduction under sec. 194J. The payments attracting TDS under 194J are services specific and not person specific;

3) Modeling is display of merchandise. Acting  on the other hand, means,  to act in play or film i.e. to portray a role authored by a story-writer with different purposes and objects and not to display merchandise to boost sales of a  manufacturer/trader of products or services; and

4) Therefore, as modeling payments have nothing to do with acting in a cinematograph film, no TDS liability attracts under section 194J on payments made to a film actor for modeling services - Kodak India (P.) Ltd. v. Dy.CIT [2013] 32 taxmann.com 88 (Mumbai - Trib.)

Cremation services are covered in negative list

Cremation services provided by a crematorium operated by any assessee, including a local authority, are covered under negative list under section 66D(q)

In the instant case, the assessee, a charitable association, was operating a crematorium in the town of Halle. It made an application to the Department, seeking information as to the tax reference number under which the last notice of tax assessment was issued to Lutherstadt Eisleben, a local authority, which also operated a crematorium. The Department denied any such information. So, the moot question that arose for consideration of Court was:

Whether a private taxable person which is in competition with a body governed by public law may rely on the second sub-paragraph of Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive in order to assert that its rights have been infringed upon by the treatment of that body as a non-taxable person or when under taxed?

European Court of Justice held as under

1) Second sub-paragraph of Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive is intended to ensure compliance with the principle of neutrality of the tax, which, in particular, precludes treating similar supplies of services, which are in competition with each other, differently for VAT purposes;

2) That provision contains derogation from the rule of treatment of bodies governed by public law as non-taxable persons in respect of the activities or transactions engaged in by them as public authorities, where such treatment would lead to significant distortions of competition;

3) Consequently, if the exemption of the economic activity in question from VAT was to give rise to distortions of competition within the meaning of the second sub-paragraph of Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive, the operation of a crematorium by Lutherstadt Eisleben would be taxable by virtue of same provision;

4) It is for the national Court to determine whether there are economic circumstances which justify, in particular case, an exception to the rule of the treatment of bodies governed by public law as non-taxable persons;

5) Consequently, a private person who is in competition with a body governed by public law and alleges that that body is, in respect of the activities in which it engages in as a public authority, treated as a non-taxable person for VAT purposes or is under taxed is entitled to rely, before the national court, on the basis of second sub-paragraph of Article 4(5) of the Sixth Directive in proceedings, such as the main proceedings, between a private person and the national tax authorities -FINANZAMT EISLEBEN VS. FEUERBESTATTUNGSVEREIN HALLE EV [2013] 30 TAXMANN.COM 226 (ECJ) 

Soul and substance of ‘charity’ is missing in IPL matches; Registration of TN Cricket Association revoked

Soul and substance of ‘charity’ is missing in IPL matches; Registration of TN Cricket Association revoked

IPL is commercial venture to maximize revenues from cricket. Registration of cricket associations conducting IPL matches are liable to be cancelled under section 12AA(3) by invoking the first proviso to section 2(15)

In the instant case, the following issues came for consideration of Chennai ITAT:

a) Whether IPL matches come within conceptual definition of charity vis-a-vis activity of general public utility under section 2(15)?

b) Whether registration of Tamil Nadu Cricket Association conducting IPL matches could be cancelled under section 12AA?

The Tribunal held in favour of revenue as under:

1) The phrase “Advancement of an object of general public utility” used in  the inclusive definition of ‘charitable purpose’  under section 2(15) cannot be divorced from the inherent concept of ‘charitable purpose’;

2) The soul and substance of ‘charity’ is activity carried on by kind and sympathetic people for the help of those in need. None of the activities of an assessee can be considered as charitable purpose if it is devoid of soul and substance of charity;

3) IPL matches are commercial ventures. Nothing ‘charitable’ is there in conducting IPL matches as the soul and substance of charity is missing. Cost of tickets is very high, laymen cannot buy them;

4) Cricket associations are oriented towards maximizing revenue from high ticket prices and advertisements. Free tickets aren’t provided to so-called slum dogs and other poor people to watch IPL.  Instead these are issued to VIPs and dignitaries;

5) IPL teams are owned by different sponsors including industrial houses and film stars. They select players on auction basis and quote highest price for the best players. Capital invested by owners of teams is redeemed by advertisement revenue;

6) By no stretch of imagination IPL matches can be called as activities of public utility carried on by assessee. IPL cricket matches, celebrity cricket matches (involving film stars) do not have any element of public utility. They are either after fame or money;

7) IPL matches are further garnished by cheer girls and fanfare. These are marketing strategies by which cricket associations are trying to sell the game of cricket at the highest amount that could be collected;

8) Thus, registration of Tamil  Nadu Cricket Association was cancelled as IPL matches do not come within the ambit of inclusive definition of charitable purpose under section 2(15) - Tamil Nadu Cricket Association v. DIT(Exemptions) [2013] 32 taxmann.com 50 (Chennai - Trib.)

Sec. 80-IB allowed to SSI located in industrially backward State even if it manufactures Schedule XI items

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An industrial undertaking recognized as an SSI and situated in an 'industrially backward State' will be eligible for deduction under section 80-IB, even if it manufactures items specified in Eleventh Schedule

In the instant case, the assessee was engaged in manufacturing of items specified in Eleventh Schedule and its manufacturing unit was located in Pondicherry, an 'Industrially backward state'. It was registered as small scale industry (‘SSI’) with the Directorate of Industries and Commerce Pondicherry. It claimed deduction under section 80-IB. The AO held that as the item manufactured by the assessee was an article specified in Schedule XI, it was not eligible for deduction under section 80-IB. On appeal, the CIT(A) allowed the claim of the assessee, on the ground that an SSI or an industrial undertaking situated in an industrially backward state, is eligible for deduction under section 80-IB even if it manufactures items specified in Eleventh Schedule. Revenue appealed to the Tribunal against such order.

The Tribunal held in favour of assessee as under:

1. The section 80-IB deductions in the case of an undertaking situated in industrially backward area (as specified in VII Schedule) is governed by the provisions of Sec. 80-IB(4). The only requirement in such case is that the industrial undertaking should be located in an industrially backward State;
2. All SSI units can also take exception to clause (iii) of sub-section (2) of section 80-IB. Once the requirements of SSI are fulfilled, the assessee falls under the first limb of exceptions of proviso to clause (iii). In such a case, the assessee is eligible for deduction even if they manufacture items specified in 11^th schedule notwithstanding the location of the undertaking i.e. whether located in an industrially backward State or other states;

3. The exceptions specified in the proviso to clause (iii) i.e. being "Small Scale Industries" or "located in an industrially backward State" are independent of each order. The assessee is not required to fulfill both of these two conditions. If any one requirements is fulfilled the assessee is eligible for deduction, irrespective of the fulfillment of the other condition; and

4. Therefore, there is no good and valid reason to interfere with the reasoning of the CIT(A) – Dy.CIT v. Eye Photonics India (P.) Ltd [2013] 31 taxmann.com 387 (Chennai - Trib.)

Improvements which enhance therapeutic efficacy of a medicine are patentable

No patents for improvements to existing medicines other than improvements in therapeutic efficacy in view of higher “patentability” threshold in section 3(d) of the Patents Act.

Novartis’ Patent application for cancer medicine rejected by SC as it was “copy and paste” of Zimmermann patent and mere change in form with no improvement in therapeutic efficacy, hence, hit by section 3(d) of the Patents Act.

In the instant case, the appellant (Novartis) filed the application for grant of patent for Imatinib Mesylate in beta crystalline form at the Chennai Patents Office. The Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs held that the patentability of the alleged invention was disallowed by section 3(d) of the Act. Appellant’s appeal was dismissed by the IPAB. Hence, the appellant filed present SLP to SC against IPAB‘s orders under article 136 of the Constitution.

Supreme Court held against appellant as under:

1) For grant of patent the subject must satisfy the twin tests of “invention” and “patentability”. Something may be an “invention” as the term is generally understood, yet it may not qualify as an “invention” for the purposes of the Act. Further, something may even qualify as an “invention” as defined under the Act, yet may be denied patent for larger considerations as may be stipulated in the Act;

2) After the amendment with effect from Jan 1, 2005, section 3(d) reads as under:

“Section 3. What are not inventions? The following are not inventions within the meaning of this Act,—(d) the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant.”

The aforementioned amendment to section 3(d) is one of the most crucial amendments that saw the Bill through the Parliament and, as noted, the amendment is primarily in respect of medicines and drugs and, to some extent, in respect of chemical substances used in agriculture.

3) There is no force in this submission that section 3(d) is a provision ex majore cautela. In course of the Parliamentary debates, the amendment to section 3(d) was the only provision cited by the Government to allay the fears of the opposition members concerning the abuses to which a product patent in medicines may be vulnerable to. We have, therefore, no doubt in that the amendment/addition made to section 3(d) is meant especially to deal with chemical substances, and more particularly with  pharmaceutical products.

4) The amended portion of section 3(d) clearly sets-up a second tier of qualifying standards for chemical substances/pharmaceutical products in order to leave the door open for true and genuine inventions but, at the same time, to check any attempt at repetitive patenting or extension of the patent term to spurious products. Section 3(d) represents “patentability”, a concept distinct and separate from “invention”.

If clause (d) is isolated from the rest of section 3, and the legislative history behind the incorporation of Chapter II in the Patents Act, 1970, is disregarded, then it is possible to see section 3(d) as an extension of the definition of “invention” and to link section 3(d) with clauses (j) and (ja) of section 2(1);

5) On reading clauses (j) and (ja) of section 2(1) with section 3(d) it would be clear that the Act sets different standards for qualifying as “inventions” in case of things belonging to different classes.  For medicines and drugs and other chemical substances, the Act sets the invention threshold even higher, by virtue of the amendments made to section 3(d) in the year 2005;

6) Imatinib Mesylate is a known substance from the Zimmermann patent itself. Not only is Imatinib Mesylate known as a substance of the Zimmermann patent, but its pharmacological properties are also known in the Zimmermann patent.  In the article published in the Cancer Research journal, the consequential finding is that Imatinib Mesylate does not qualify the test of “invention” as laid down in section 2(1)(j) and section 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act, 1970;

7) The efficacy of Imatinib was equally known, as is evident from the Zimmermann patent itself. The subject product, that is, beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate, is, thus, clearly a new form of a known substance, i.e., Imatinib Mesylate, of which the efficacy was well known. It, therefore, fully attracts section 3(d) and must be shown to satisfy the substantive provision and the Explanation appended to it.

8) Now, when all the pharmacological properties of beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate are equally possessed by Imatinib in free base form or its salt, where is the question of the subject product having any enhanced efficacy over the known substance of which it is a new form?.

9) On the issue of section 3(d), there appears to be a major weakness in the case of the appellant. There is no clarity at all as to what is the substance immediately preceding the subject product - the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate? In course of the hearing, the counsel appearing for the appellant greatly stressed fact that in terms of invention, the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate is two stages removed from Imatinib in free base form. The same is said in the written notes of submissions filed on behalf of the appellant. But this position is not reflected in the subject application, in which all the references are only to Imatinib in free base form (or to the alpha crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate in respect of flow properties, thermo-dynamic stability and lower hygroscopicity);.

10) What is “efficacy”? Efficacy means1 “the ability to produce a desired or intended result”. Hence, the test of efficacy in the context of section 3(d) would be different, depending upon the result the product under consideration is desired or intended to produce. In other words, the test of efficacy would depend upon the function, utility or the purpose of the product under consideration. Therefore, in the case of a medicine that claims to cure a disease, the test of efficacy can only be “therapeutic efficacy”. The question then arises, what would be the parameter of therapeutic efficacy and what are the advantages and benefits that may be taken into account for determining the enhancement of therapeutic efficacy?

11) With regard to the genesis of section 3(d), more particularly, the circumstances in which section 3(d) was amended to make it even more constrictive than before, we have no doubt in that the “therapeutic efficacy” of a medicine must be judged strictly and narrowly. Our inference that the test of enhanced efficacy in case of chemical substances, especially medicine, should receive a narrow and strict interpretation is based not only on external factors but also on sufficient internal evidences that lead to the same view. It may be noted that the text added to section 3(d) by the 2005 amendment lays down the condition of “enhancement of the known efficacy”;

12) Further, the Explanation requires the derivative to “differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy”. What is evident, therefore, is that not all advantageous or beneficial properties are relevant, but only such properties that directly relate to efficacy, which in case of medicine is its therapeutic efficacy.

13) In case of chemicals, especially pharmaceuticals, if the product for which patent protection is claimed is a new form of a known substance with known efficacy, then the subject product must pass, in addition to clauses (j) and (ja) of section 2(1), the test of enhanced efficacy as provided for in section 3(d), read with its Explanation. Beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate failed in both the tests of invention and patentability as provided under clauses (j), (ja) of section 2(1) and section 3(d), respectively, and, thus, the appeals filed by Novartis AG failed and were to be dismissed with costs - Novartis AG v. Union of India [2013] 32 taxmann.com 1 (SC)

Mere classification of account as NPA doesn’t demonstrate uncertainty in collection of interest thereon

In the instant case, the assessee was a Non-Banking Financial Corporation. For the relevant assessment years, AO added interest accrued on non-performing assets (‘NPA’) to the assessee's taxable income. The CIT(A) allowed assessee's appeal holding that the interest accrued on NPA was not exigible to income tax. On revenue’s appeal, the Tribunal upheld the order of CIT(A), and held that no addition could be made in the hands of assessee in respect of unrealized accrued interest when the loan was classified as NPA. Aggrieved by the order of Tribunal, revenue preferred an appeal to the High Court.

The HC held in favour of revenue as under:

1) Mere characterization of an account as NPA wouldn’t by itself sufficient to say that there was uncertainty as regards realization of income or interest income thereon;

2) Accrual of interest is a matter of fact to be decided separately for each case on the basis of examination of the facts and circumstances. The same would require an assessment of the relevant facts and circumstances. Only by assessment of facts and circumstances, the authority could arrive at a decision whether there is uncertainty about accrual of interest income on NPA. Only when there is uncertainty of realization of income or interest income then it is not chargeable to tax;

3) AO hadn’t recorded any finding whether there was any uncertainty in collection of income and, moreover, there was nothing to indicate that the 'interest income' was non-recoverable. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal hadn’t considered the matter in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Southern Technologies Ltd. v. Jt. CIT [2010] 187 Taxman 346.

4) Thus, the order of the Tribunal was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the AO for consideration afresh in the light of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Southern Technologies Ltd. (supra) – CIT v. Sakthi Finance Ltd [2013] 31 taxmann.com 305 (Madras)

CBDT’s circular on Transfer pricing issues - Identification of development centre and application of PSM

CBDT has issued two important circulars in relation to identification of development centres engaged in contract ‘R&D Activities’ and application of profit split method

When TPO can prefer TNMM or CUP method over PSM where intangibles are involved, CBDT clarifies

Rule 10B(1)(d) prescribes that the Profit Split Method is applicable mainly in international transaction involving transfer of unique intangibles. However, vide Circular No. 02/2013, the CBDT clarifies that TPO may consider TNMM or CUP method as most appropriate method instead of Profit Split Method for selection of comparables engaged in development of intangibles in same line of business, provided:

1) TPO should be of the view that PSM cannot be applied due to non-availability of information and reliable data required for application of the method;

2) He records reasons for non-applicability of PSM.

(View circular)

How to identify development centres engaged in contract R&D services with insignificant risk, CBDT clarifies

A development centre in India (‘IDC’) may be treated as a contract R&D service provider with insignificant risk if following conditions are satisfied:

1) Foreign principal performs most of the economically significant functions involved in research and development cycle whereas IDC would largely be involved in economically insignificant functions;

2) Economically significant assets including intangibles for R&D activities are provided by principal and IDC would not use any other economically significant assets;

3) IDC works under direct control and supervision of foreign principal;

4) IDC doesn’t assume or has no economically significant realized risks; and

5) IDC has no ownership right (legal or economic) on outcome of research which vests with foreign principal.

Further, the CBDT clarifies that the above conditions should be borne out of the conduct of the parties and not merely by the contractual terms.

(View circular)

Exp. on ‘clinical drug trial’ is deductible even if the impossible “incurred in-house” condition isn’t satisfied

Explanation to Section 35(2AB)(1) does not require that the expenses which are included in this explanation are essentially to be incurred inside an in-house research facility because it is not possible to incur these expenses for in-house research facility

In the instant case, the issue that arose for consideration of HC was as under:
"Whether the expenditure which was not incurred in an in-house research facility could be discarded for weighted deduction under sec. 35(2AB) of IT Act?”

Deliberating on the issue, the HC held in favour of assessee as under:

1) The Explanation to section 35(2AB)(1) provides that expenditure on scientific research in relation to drugs and pharmaceuticals shall include expenditure incurred on clinical drug trials, obtaining approval from any regulatory authority and filing an application for a patent under the Patents Act, 1970. The whole idea thus appears to be to give encouragement to scientific research. By its very nature, clinical trials may not always be possible to be conducted in closed laboratory or in similar in-house facility provided by the assessee and approved by the prescribed authority;

2) Before a pharmaceutical drug could be put in the market, the regulatory authorities would insist on strict tests and research on all possible aspects, such as possible reactions, effect of the drug and so on;

3) Extensive clinical trials, therefore, would be an intrinsic part of development of any such new pharmaceutical drug. It cannot be imagined that such clinical trial can be carried out only in the laboratory of the pharmaceutical company;

4) The activities of obtaining approval of the authority and filing of an application for patent necessarily have to be outside the in-house research facility. Thus, the restricted meaning suggested by the Revenue would completely make the explanation quite meaningless;

5) Segregation of the expenditure by prescribed authority into two parts, namely, those incurred within the in-house facility and outside, by itself would not be sufficient to deny the benefit to the assessee under section35(2AB) of the Act - Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. CIT [2013] 31 taxmann.com 300 (Gujarat)

Related case:
Exp. on ‘drug trials’ can’t be disallowed even if it isn’t incurred in-house as trials can be carried outside labs only - Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v Addl CIT [2013] 29 taxmann.com 229 (Ahmadabad - Trib.)

Validity of retro amendment made to sec. 115JB by FA, 2009 can’t be challenged as it was made to widen the tax base

The amendment made to Explanation 1 to Section 115JB of the IT Act, by the Finance Act, 2009 by insertion of clause (i) with retrospective effect from 1.4.2001 is not ultra vires or unconstitutional.

In the instant writ petition, the petitioner-company challenged the constitutional validity of retrospective amendment made to Section 115 JB of the IT Act, by the Finance Act, 2009 by insertion of clause (i) in the Explanation 1(requiring addition to book profit of provisions for diminution of asset).

HC held in favour of revenue as under:

1) No merit in the contention of assessee that amendment imposes  a new tax or new levy outside the scope of section 115JB
a) The purpose of the Explanation is to broaden the base amount on which tax is payable by the company. The tax-base stands widened by the amendment inasmuch as the amount or amounts set aside as provision for diminution in the value of any asset and debited to the profit and loss account shall be added to the book profit;

b) The tax which was essentially a tax on the book profit and, consequently, a tax on the total income of the petitioner does not cease to be such a tax or become a new or different tax in nature and character merely because one more item is prescribed to be added to the book profit shown in the profit and loss account from a retrospective date;

c)  The tax was always on the book profit and on the total income of the company; it continues to remain so even after the retrospective amendment, the change being not in the nature and character of the tax, but on the quantum of the book profit/total income of the company on which it is charged. Since the amendment does not provide for any new levy of income-tax, there is no question of it being struck down on the ground of retrospectivity.

2) Not sufficient to show that amendment travels beyond section 115JB, but it is necessary to show that it goes beyond the relevant entry in the Constitution
a) In order to successfully challenge the retrospectivity of the amendment it is necessary for the petitioner to show that the retrospective operation so completely alters the character of the tax as to take it outside the limits of the entry which gives the legislature competence to enact the law;

b) The nature of the tax has not undergone any change and it still remains a tax on the book profit of the company. All it does is to widen the base upon which the levy operates by adding one more category of a debit to the profit and loss account by which the book profit of the company can be increase;

c) Explanation 1 to the Section prescribes the manner in which the book profit of a company shall be computed. It is upon the book profit so computed, after giving effect to the said Explanation, that the tax is payable by the company;

d) It is difficult to accept the argument that the insertion of clause (i) with retrospective effect into the Explanation 1 so completely alters the nature and character of the tax that it falls beyond the Entry 82 in the Union List of the Constitution (“Taxes on income other than agricultural income”) and ,consequently, is beyond the competence of the legislature.

3) The retro amendment doesn’t take away with retrospective effect any benefit which is granted by the legislature
a) It would be incorrect to treat the provisions of Section 80J and the provisions of Section 115JB on par and require the same standards to be fulfilled to enact a valid legislative amendment with retrospective effect in both of them;

b) It would be erroneous and inaccurate to consider any deduction allowed while computing the book profit of the company as a benefit or relief granted to it in the same manner in which Section 80J conferred a benefit upon an assessee who set-up an industrial undertaking in a notified backward area. The scheme and purpose are so different that a comparison of both the provisions would be totally off the mark;

c) There is considerable difference between provisions conceived as incentive or relief provisions, (enacted with a view to foster industrial growth and scientific research activities in the country) and those which essentially seek to bring within the purview of the fiscal legislation companies which have not paid any tax, though have been earning substantial profits and also dividends;

d) If this essential difference between the two types of provisions is kept in mind, it will be apparent that there can be no question of the retrospective amendment under challenge not serving the larger public interest. Thus, the writ Petition dismissed but with no order as to costs -  Whirlpool of India Ltd. v. Union of India [2013] 31 taxmann.com 200 (Delhi)

A retro amendment to a tax incentive provision which is merely clarificatory isn’t unconstitutional

Gujarat HC upholds the validity of retro amendment made by way of insertion of an Explanation below sec. 80-IA(13), which clarifies that no deduction is available under 80-IA for execution of work contracts.

In the instant case, the petitioner challenged the vires of Explanation inserted in Sec. 80IA(4) by Finance Act 2009. The case of the petitioner was that it was engaged in the development of infrastructure facility. Till the introduction of impugned amendment, deductions were available to all undertakings and enterprises executing infrastructure development projects and it was not required that the assessee itself must develop such infrastructure facilities by investing its own funds. Such Explanation, therefore, changes the very complexion of the deductions which were available for years together and, thus, creates a levy with retrospective effect. The petitioner challenged such explanation, in particular, on the ground of retrospective operation of such amendment.

HC upholds the retrospective operation of amendment, and held as under:

1. The Explanation merely clarifies that deduction under section 80IA(4) would not be available in case of execution of works contract. Even without the aid of this explanation, it is possible to contend that an enterprise executing a works contract isn’t eligible to sec. 80-IA(4) deduction;
   
   
2. In view of the Gujarat HC verdict’s in the case of CIT v. Radhe Developers [2012] 17 taxmann.com 156 (Guj.), there would certainly be a demarcation between developing the facility and execution of works contract awarded by an agency engaged in developing such facility. From the inception, deduction is envisaged for development of infrastructure facilities with private participation;
   
   
3. The impugned explanation is purely explanatory in nature and doesn’t amend the existing statutory provisions, thus, the question of levying any tax with retrospective effect would not arise;
   
   
4. The explanation doesn’t restrict or aim to restrict the provisions of deduction. If it does so, certainly a question of reasonableness in the context of retrospective operation would arise. The Explanation only supplies clarity where, at best confusion is possible in the unamended provision. The revenue could, therefore, legitimately contend that no such deduction is available for mere execution of works contract. Thus, the present petition is dismissed – Katira Construction Ltd. v. Union of India[2013] 31 taxmann.com 250 (Gujarat)